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DEFINITION OF "RULE" UNDER THE MINNESOTA
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
Administrative agencies possess both adjdicatoy and rulemaking powers. This
Note focuses on agency rulemaking power. In particular this Note analyzes the
definitin of "rule" under the Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act and dis-
cusses the three types of rules: interpretive, legislative, and procedural. In addi-
tion, relevant Minnesota Supreme Court decisions are examined. Finally, statutory
changes are suggested.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background
The area of administrative law has expanded greatly in recent years
primarily as a result of increased governmental involvement in the econ-
omy and increased governmental entitlements.I The tremendous growth
in administrative law also has been attributed to the reforms of the New
1. See Gellhorn & Robinson, Perspectives on Admznisrative Law, 75 COLUM. L. REV.
771, 771-72 (1975).
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Deal.2 Increased government regulation was imperative in light of New
Deal reforms such as a retirement program for the elderly, the National
Labor Relations Board, a program to oversee trading in the securities
markets, and a system of subsidies and quotas for controlling agricultural
production.3 With the increased complexity of our social, economic, and
industrial systems has come the need for flexibility in the administration
of these systems. The resulting demands made on legislatures and courts
have led to the creation of numerous state and federal administrative
agencies.
4
Administrative agencies are better equipped than legislatures or courts
to implement and supervise the new governmental programs because
agencies possess the ability to perform both legislative and adjudicative
functions.5 Unlike legislators and some judges, agency personnel do not
serve at the pleasure of an electorate; the functioning of agency staff is
not being constantly interrupted by the electoral process.6 Agencies, un-
like legislatures or courts, can devote more attention to details because
agencies deal with a comparatively narrow scope of issues.7 Perhaps one
of the biggest advantages of an agency is its ability to specialize and to
develop expertise in highly technical areas. While legislatures continue
to set the major policy framework, agencies, because they have the time
and the personnel, often are better able to set up and enforce specific
programs.8 Some commentators have recognized adjudication by ad-
ministrative agencies is easier and faster than adjudication by the
2. See I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1:7, at 20-24 (2d ed. 1978);
Rabin, Administrative Law in Transition' A Discipline in Search of an Organizing Pnncrple, 72
Nw. U.L. REV. 120, 120-25 (1977).
3. See Rabin, supra note 2, at 121.
4. At the state level, administrative agencies regulate activities such as air pollution,
agriculture, banking, civil rights, civil service, conservation, corporations, some aspects of
divorce law, fair employment practices, fisheries, highways, horse racing, insurance, labor,
licensing, liquor control, mediation, occupational permits, prisoner parole, professional li-
censing, public health, public utilities, public welfare, railroads, revenue, securities, taxa-
tion, trucking, unemployment, unfair competition, veterans' affairs, water resources,
workmens' compensation, zoning, and literally dozens of other fields of activity. See 1 F.
COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 2 (1965).
5. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 1.05, at 13-19 (1959).
6. While the statement is true with respect to agency staff members, most high-level
agency officials are political appointees who can be removed at will. See R. LORCH, DEM-
OCRATIC PROCESS AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 55-56 (1969). Federal independent regula-
tory agencies such as the FTC, FCC, ICC, and NLRB, however, have been established
with agency heads who cannot be fired except for cause. See id.
7. See Wesland v. Railroad & Warehouse Comm'n, 251 Minn. 504, 509, 88 N.W.2d
834, 838 (1958).
8. See W. GELLHORN, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 27 (1941) ("Be-
cause the subject matters involved are often technical in nature---superintendence of
transportation, or communications, or finance, or health-it is felt that only 'experts' or
'specialists' can effectively cope with them, and hence they have been segregated from
other subject matters and entrusted to administrative agencies.").
[Vol. 7
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courts.9 Administrative agencies are not subject to the rigid procedural
framework imposed on courts.10 Finally, administrative agencies, unlike
courts, can initiate a wide range of investigations.I"
Agency policy making generally takes one of two forms-adjudication
or rulemaking. 12 The traditional distinction between rulemaking and
adjudication is that rulemaking is legislative in nature and adjudication
is judicial in nature. 1 3 When an agency possesses both "adjudicatory and
rule-making powers covering the same subject matter, the agency'gener-
ally may choose whether to proceed by means of adjudication or
rulemaking in resolving particular policy problems confronting them."14
The choice of agencies generally has been to proceed by rulemaking.15
The purpose of this Note is to examine the Minnesota statutory defini-
tion of the term "rule" and to examine the Minnesota cases that have
attempted further to define the term. Agency rulemaking has been di-
vided into three categories: informal, formal, and precedents derived
from agency adjudications after compliance with formal rulemaking pro-
cedures.16 The increased use of agency rulemaking has led to a greater
9. See K. DAVIS, supra note 5, § 1.05, at 15-16.
10. See id at 16-17.
11. See id at 17; W. GELLHORN, supra note 8, at 27 ("Unlike the courts, some of the
agencies do not wait for cases to be brought to them for decision. Instead they assume the
burden of preparing and presenting cases which have relationship to the desired public
ends."). Seegenerally K. DAVIS, supra note 5, at §§ 3.01-.14.
12. See Fuchs, Development and Diversifcation in Administrative Rule Making, 72 Nw. U.L.
REV. 83, 87 (1977). Professor Davis correctly acknowledges that some agency activity does
not fall within either the adjudication or rulemaking category. See 1 K. DAVIS, supra note
2, § 1:4, at 13. Professor Davis states:
Even though the Administrative Procedure Act defines "adjudication" in
§§ 551(6) and (7) as process for a final disposition in a matter other than
rulemaking, and even though that definition, if taken literally, means that all
administrative action is either adjudication or rulemaking, Congress lacks the
practical power to change the customary thinking of judges and practitioners
and commentators, who continue to assume that a good deal of administrative
action is neither adjudication nor rulemaking. Agencies do not necessarily either
adjudicate or make rules when they initiate, investigate, threaten, publicize, con-
ceal, plan, recommend, and supervise. Some informal action of agencies is in the
nature of informal adjudication, and some is in the nature of informal rulemak-
ing, but the general understanding continues that some informal action is
neither adjudication nor rulemaking.
Id
13. 3 B. MEZINES, J. STEIN & J. GRUFF, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 13.02[3], at 13-28
to 13-29 (1981). Federal agency adjudications are governed by two procedures set forth in
sections 554 to 555 of title 5 of the United States Code. Rulemaking procedures are set forth
in section 553 and sections 556 to 557.
14. Fuchs, supra note 12, at 89.
15. See id
16. See United States v. MacDaniel, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 1, 15 (1833) ("[U]sages have been
established in every department of the government, which have become a kind of common
law, and regulate the rights and duties of those who act within their respective limits.");
Davis, Administrative Rules-Interretative, Legislative, and Retroactive, 57 YALE L.J. 919, 921
(1948) ("Something that either is akin to rule-making or is rule-making takes place when
1981]
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awareness by those dealing with agencies that much of an agency's activ-
ity is the making of policy. Because of the wide range of agency activity
that falls within the scope of rulemaking, it is often difficult to determine
what is a rule and what is not. In addition to the difficulty in classifying
agency activity as rulemaking, a problem arises when attempting to de-
termine the appropriate weight to be given to agency rules. For exam-
ple, in Minnesota-Dakotas Reiai/ Hardware Association v. Stale,17 the
Minnesota Supreme Court stated that interpretive rules do not have the
force of law; yet they are required to be promulgated pursuant to chapter
15 of Minnesota Statutes.18 The statute provides, however, that all rules
made pursuant to chapter 15 have the force and effect of law.19 This
Note also will attempt to identify and distinguish the various types of
rules, and to describe the functions that they perform.
B AdminLstratz've Power
Administrative action is based on the delegation of power to agencies
by either state or federal legislatures.20 Typically, such delegations in-
volve a combination of powers. For example, a single agency may legis-
late rules implementing a statute, search for violations of the rules, and if
the agency discovers a suspected violation, prosecute the violator at a
hearing with the agency acting as judge.2 1 The Minnesota Supreme
Court has stated that administrative agencies have only such powers as
are given them by the statutes creating them and that they must exercise
their powers in conformity with those statutes.2 2 Similarly, other state
courts have allowed a combination of legislative, adjudicative, and
prosecutorial functions in a single agency when there is a practical neces-
sity for such a combination and a system of checks and balances to guard
against abuses of administrative discretion.23
The traditional view of rulemaking has been that rules adopted pursu-
particular courses of official action are repeatedly followed."); Wright, Rulemaking andjudi-
cial Review, 30 AD. L. REV. 461, 462-63 (1978).
17. 279 N.W.2d 360 (Minn. 1979).
18. See id at 364 n.6.
19. See MINN. STAT. § 15.0413 (Supp. 1981).
20. For a general discussion of delegation of power in the administrative law context,
see 1 F. COOPER, supra note 4, at 31-94; 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 2, §§ 3:1-:18; K. DAVIS,
supra note 5, §§ 2.01-.16; M. FORKOSCH, A TREATISE ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §§ 80-
100 (1956).
21. See 1 F. COOPER, supra note 4, at 25. In discussing the delegation of combined
powers to administrative agencies, Professor Cooper states that "[e]xcept in the compara-
tively rare cases . . . where a combination of powers in a single agency was deemed to
threaten, in some measure, the respective primacies of the legislature or of the courts, the
states have sustained the delegation of combined legislative, prosecutory, and judicial
powers to agencies." Id
22. See Yoselowitz v. Peoples Bakery, Inc., 201 Minn. 600, 606-07, 277 N.W. 221, 225
(1938).
23. 1 F. COOPER, supra note 4, at 17 ("In the absence of such safeguards, the state
[Vol. 7
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ant to a specific grant of power were considered to have the force of law,
and that rules adopted pursuant to a general delegation of power were
considered to interpret the law.24 Many jurisdictions, however, no longer
require a specific statutory delegation of power to adopt legislative rules.
Rather, these jurisdictions allow rules to be adopted under a general del-
egation of power when such rules are deemed to be necessary in light of a
construction or interpretation of a statute.
25
II. DEFINITION OF "RULE"
A. In General
Legal scholars generally have recognized that "rule" is incapable of
precise definition. 26 Professor Davis states that a "precise definition [of
rule] in the abstract is not necessarily desirable, for the same function
may well be regarded as rulemaking for one purpose or in one context
and as something else for some other purpose or in another context."
2 7 It
is important, however, to define "rule" because the application and in-
terpretation of law inevitably depends in part on the meaning of words.
28
courts are still prepared to strike down statutes which grant an agency powers so unlim-
ited as to enable the agency in practical effect to displace the legislature and the courts.").
24. See notes 98-99 infra and accompanying text.
25. See Asimow, Public Participation in the Adoption of Interpretive Rules and Poliy State-
ments, 75 MICH. L. REV. 520, 561 (1977) ("Today, however, it is universally accepted that
agencies can adopt legislative rules pursuant to general rule-making powers.").
In discussing the power to make rules, Professor Fuchs states that
the potential for agency resort to rule making results from the range of rulemak-
ing authority which agencies possess. This authority has come to depend in-
creasingly on explicit statutory provisions, yet it still depends in part on
authorization which inheres in the requirements of good administration. These
inherent requirements which regulations can help to fulfill include the effective
announcement of an agency's prescriptions for doing business with it, such as are
set forth in procedural rules; the issuance of internal directives to staff members;
and the announcement for the information and guidance of persons concerned of
policies and legal interpretations that are expected to determine future agency
action. Unlike these kinds of pronouncements which may be authorized im-
pliedly from the agency's very existence and need to administer, rules which
legally dispose of outside interests, such as regulations which proscribe conduct
or define enforceable rights, should rest on more specific statutory or constitu-
tional authority to issue them, since otherwise the agency would be the architect
of its own powers.
Fuchs, supra note 12, at 89-90 (footnote omitted).
26. See, e.g., K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TEXT § 5.01, at 123 (3d ed. 1972); 3 B.
MEZINES, J. STEIN & J. GRUFF, supra note 13, § 13.02, at 13-9, 13-25; Davis, supra note 16,
at 919.
27. See K. DAVIS, supra note 26, § 5.01, at 123.
28. Professor Davis stated:
[Definitions] often control the results when practical problems come to court.
Both legislative bodies and courts have to define the terms they use, and then
problems have to be worked out by applying logic to the definitions; every sys-
tem of law has to rest in part on the meaning of words.
2 K. DAVIS, supra note 2, § 7:6, at 32-33 (2d ed. 1979).
1981]
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Although commentators agree that defining "rule" and "rulemaking" is
difficult, many authors nonetheless have attempted to do so. Professor
Davis states that "[a] rule is the product of rule-making, and rule-making
is the part of the administrative process that resembles a legislature's en-
actment of a statute."29 Professor Fuchs defines rulemaking as "the issu-
ance of regulations or the making of determinations which are addressed
to indicated but unnamed and unspecified persons or situations."30
Other attempts to define the term "rule" similarly have equated
rulemaking with legislative conduct on the administrative level.3'
The spectrum of activity denoted as rulemaking ranges from the every-
day decisions of agency personnel to detailed regulations.32 To illustrate
further the broad range of activity that could be labeled rulemaking,
take the example of someone requesting that an agency pursue a certain
course of conduct. Should the agency decide not to pursue that conduct,
that decision in itself arguably would constitute rulemaking. Professor
Davis acknowledges that "[i]f emphasis is given to the multiplicity of
meanings of the word 'rule,' one might guess that only about one percent
of all 'rules' that agencies make are governed by procedures that allow
29. Davis, supra note 16, at 919.
30. Fuchs, Procedure in Admifnstrative Rule-Making, 52 HARv. L. REV. 259, 265 (1938).
Justice Holmes offered the following definition of rulemaking:
A judicial inquiry investigates, declares, and enforces liabilities as they stand on
present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist. That is its pur-
pose and end. Legislation on the other hand looks to the future and changes
existing conditions by making a new rule to be applied thereafter to all or some
part of those subject to its power. The establishment of a rate is the making of a
rule for the future, and therefore is an act legislative, not judicial ....
Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908). The theory of Justice
Holmes' definition was later embodied in FAPA. Professor Davis is of the opinion that the
definition offered by Justice Holmes "has produced many unsatisfactory practical results."
Davis, supra note 16, at 920. As an example, Professor Davis cites Oklahoma Packing Co.
v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 309 U.S. 4 (1940), a case he says is "permeated with concep-
tualism and unrealism." Davis, supra note 16, at 920 n.4.
31. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Federal Power Comm'n, 458 F.2d 731, 742 (D.C. Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1074 (1972); Willapoint Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing, 174 F.2d 676,
686-87, 693 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949); American Express Co. v. United
States, 472 F.2d 1050, 1055 (C.C.P.A. 1973); 3 B. MEZINES, J. STEIN & J. GRUFF, supra
note 13, § 13.02[3], at 13-28. "Rulemaking, the quasi-legislative power, is intended to add
substance to the Acts of Congress, to complete absent but necessary details, and to resolve
unexpected problems." Id § 14.01, at 14-2 (footnotes omitted).
32. Professor Davis has stated:
All "rules" could be lined up on a scale from unthinking habits of a single
public employee at a low level to the most formal "rules" published in the Code
of Federal Regulations, such as, for instance, the Federal Reserve Board's Regu-
lation Z, which is formal, elaborate, detailed,. . . and has acquired almost the
status of a statute. Neither the statutory law nor the judicial case law has crystal-
lized a line between the two ends of the scale, separating a statement by the
lowly employee that "my rule is to do thus and so" from the formal regulation.
2 K. DAVIS, supra note 2, § 7:1, at 3 (2d ed. 1979).
[Vol. 7
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participation of affected parties."33
B. Difculy in Defn'ng the Term
. Statutory Defmttions
At least two obvious reasons exist for the difficulty in defining "rule."
The first reason is found in the various statutory definitions, which vary
greatly from state to state. Contrasting the different definitions of "rule,"
Professor Cooper finds some definitions so narrow in scope that they
deny rights to persons intended to benefit by rulemaking procedures
while other definitions are so broad that compliance with all of the pro-
ceddral requirements would overly burden administrative agencies.
34
Under the Minnesota and federal statutes "rule" is defined through
certain inclusions and exclusions. These statutes, however, remain signif-
icantly ambiguous in terms of what acts constitute rulemaking. The
Federal Administrative Procedure Act 35 (FAPA) defines "rule" as
the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular
applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or pre-
scribe law or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or prac-
tice requirements of an agency and includes the approval or
prescription for the future of rates, wages, corporate or financial struc-
tures or reorganizations thereof, prices, facilities, applicances, services
or allowances therefor or of valuations, costs, or accounting, or prac-
tices bearing on any of the foregoing . ... 36
FAPA goes on to define "rule making" as the "agency process for formu-
lating, amending, or repealing a rule."37
"Rule" is defined in the Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act 38
(MAPA) as
every agency statement of general applicability and future effect, in-
cluding amendments, suspensions, and repeals of rules, adopted to im-
plement or make specific the law enforced or administered by it or to
govern its organization or procedure. It does not include (a) rules con-
cerning only the internal management of the agency or other agencies,
33. Id
34. Professor Cooper stated:
Some [definitions] are so narrow as to deprive the intended beneficiaries of the
full enjoyment of the rights which are meant to be made available to members of
the public through the substantive provisions concerning rule-making proce-
dures and the requirements concerning publicity for rules. Conversely, some def-
initions are so broad that if the agencies were compelled to follow literally the
procedural and publicity requirements, with respect to every statement falling
within the definition of rule, then the agencies could properly complain that the
result was to impose onerous and unnecessary burdens on agency staffs.
1 F. COOPER, supra note 4, at 109-10.
35. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
36. Id § 551(4).
37. Se id § 551(5).
38. See MINN. STAT. §§ 15.041-.052 (1980 & Supp. 1981).
1981]
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and which do not directly affect the rights of or procedure available to
the public; (b) rules of the commissioner of corrections relating to the
internal management of institutions under the commissioner's control
and those rules governing the inmates thereof prescribed pursuant to
section 609.105; (c) rules of the division of game and fish published in
accordance with section 97.53; (d) rules relating to weight limitations
on the use of highways when the substance of the rules is indicated to
the public by means of signs; (e) opinions of the attorney general;
39
Similar to the Minnesota and federal definitions above, state statutes
typically define "rule" through a number of fairly common inclusions
and exclusions. 4°
a. Inclusions
Most state statutes that define "rule" contain five basic elements.
First, a "rule" usually is described in broadly inclusive terms such as by
the word "statement.' 4 1 This element is in response to the tendency of
agencies to try to avoid complying with the procedural requirements of
rulemaking by labeling certain agency activity as "bulletins," "guides,"
or "announcements.
' 42
Second, the definition usually is confined to statements of general ap-
plicability.4 3 Many states also include the requirement that the rules be
of future effect. 44 Iowa, for example, has eliminated the requirement
that rules be of future effect because "every statement of general applica-
bility must, almost by definition, have future effect at the time it is first
issued." 4 5 Professor Auerbach also recognizes that deletion of the "future
39. Id § 15.0411(3) (Supp. 1981).
40. See 1 F. COOPER, .upra note 4, at 107; Auerbach, Admimistrattue Rulemaking in Minne-
sota, 63 MINN. L. REV. 151, 156-61 (1979).
41. See 1 F. COOPER, supra note 4, at 108 ("[T]he concept should be described in
broadly inclusive terms (the word 'statement' has been most popular).").
42. See id; Davis, supra note 16, at 921-22 ("An agency may announce policies in
conrection with deciding cases, or informally through press releases or reports or speeches,
or formally through regulations. The practical effect of each of these three courses is often
almost the same, and yet a good deal may hinge on the form.").
43. See I F. COOPER, supra note 4, at 108.
44. See id at 108, 113. Professor Cooper states:
Many state statutes provide that the definition of rule applies only to state-
ments which, in addition to having general applicability, have "future effect."
Approximately an equal number of state statutes do not include this require-
ment of future effect. Its inclusion would seem to be unimportant except as a
rhetorical nicety, and its omission of little significance, because if statements of
general applicability prescribing law or policy do not have future effect they
would seem to have little effect at all.
Id at 113 (footnote omitted).
45. Bonfield, The Iowa Administratlie Procedure Act Background, Construcion, Applicability,
Pice Access to Ageny Law, the Rulemak:ng PTeessr, 60 IowA L. REV. 731, 830 (1975). Simi-
larly, Professor Cooper states that "[i]t is doubtful whether [the] addition [of the require-
ment that the rules must be of future effect] has any great significance, for there would be
[Vol. 7
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effect" requirement "eliminates a difficulty that can occur when parties
rely on a rule that is subsequently declared invalid." 46 For example, in
Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, 47 the United States Supreme Court
invalidated a rule that had been relied upon by various employers. By
deleting the "future effect" requirement, a subsequent rule could b-e
made retroactive to accommodate the employers who had relied on the
invalid rule.48
Third, most "rule" definitions encompass every statement that imple-
ments, interprets, or prescribes law or policy.49 This language has been
viewed as necessary to the definition to "ensure that every agency state-
ment will be treated as a rule if it declares, recognizes, makes, promul-
gates, prescribes, implements, interprets, indicates, creates, or authorizes
law or policy of general applicability."
5 0
Fourth, typically there is a description of the agency's organization,51
procedure, and practice requirements. 52 The rationale for these inclu-
sions is that "those doing business with an agency find that an initial
difficulty is to learn how the agency staff may properly be approached,
and this can be known only if the organization of the agency is a matter
of public knowledge."5
3
Finally, most definitions of "rule" have a provision for the amendment
or repeal of a rule.54 Minnesota also provides for the "suspension" of a
rule in its statutory definition.55 This inclusion is important because the
amendment, repeal, or suspension of a rule can be as important as the
adoption of a new rule.
56
. Exclusions
A number of subjects commonly are excluded from the statutory defi-
few cases if any where an agency statement of general applicability did not have future
effect." 1 F. COOPER, supra note 4, at 108.
46. Auerbach, supra note 40, at 157.
47. 322 U.S. 607, 618 (1944) (rule of Administrator of Department of Labor's Wage
and Hour Division defining "area of production" for which employees handling agricul-
tural or horticultural commodities for market were exempt from wage and hour provisions
of Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 declared invalid).
48. See Auerbach, supra note 40, at 157.
49. See I F. COOPER, srupra note 4, at 108.
50. Auerbach, supra note 40, at 157; see 1 F. COOPER, supra note 4, at 108 ("Thus, the
term includes not only so-called substantive regulations but also all statements setting
forth the agency's position on questions of statutory interpretation and questions of
policy.").
51. See 1 F. COOPER, supra note 4, at 109.
52. See id; Auerbach, supra note 40, at 157.
53. See I F. COOPER, supra note 4, at 109.
54. See id. ("[T]he amendment or repeal of a rule can have just as important an effect
as the adoption of a new rule.').
55. S.ee MINN. STAT. § 15.0411(3) (Supp. 1981).
56. See note 54 supra.
1981]
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nition of "rule," but there is no uniform set of exclusions. Some of the
exclusions are intended to clarify the definition of "rule." For example,
statements that concern only the internal management of an agency and
intraagency memoranda that do not directly affect private rights may be
excluded. 57 Examples of agency statements that fit within this exclusion
are "statements specifying employee vacation policies, work schedules,
work standards, promotion policies, grievance procedures, and staff bene-
fits." 5 8 Agency statements that would not come within the exclusion in-
clude "statements of general applicability defining agency law or policy
in relation to job applicants."59 The exclusion of intraagency memo-
randa is of practical necessityO so that staff members can write internal
memoranda on policy questions without complying with the statutory
rulemaking requirements.
6 1
Several possible reasons exist for a state legislature's decision to define
"rule" narrowly or broadly. One author suggests that some exclusions
are "designed merely as reassuring clarifications of the definition" while
others "apparently reflect successful lobbying tactics on the part of the
agencies which normally seek a narrow definition of the term rule, and
others reflect particular local needs." 62 Many of the exclusions from
rulemaking procedures have been criticized because an exclusion elimi-
nates the requirement of notice and public participation.
63
2. Court Decisions Regarding Defitions of "Rule"
A second reason for the difficulty in defining "rule" is that only a few
57. See 1 F. COOPER, supra note 4, at 109; Auerbach, supra note 40, at 241.
58. Bonfield, supra note 45, at 834.
59. Id
60. Examples of other common exclusions from the definition of "rule" are forms,
instructions to forms, rules addressed to specific persons, rules pertaining to military or
naval functions, educational regulations concerning admission and graduation, regula-
tions relating to commitment to and release from state institutions, emergency health
rules, rate or tariff determinations, street and highway signs or markers, activities relating
to the management and development of state property, licensing activities, and informa-
tional pamphlets. See 1 F. COOPER, supra note 4, at 117-18. The definition of "rule" in
MAPA excludes five categories of rules. See note 39 supra and accompanying text. For an
in-depth discussion of the exclusions in MAPA, the Revised Model Act, and the Iowa
APA, see Auerbach, supra note 40, at 241-51.
61. See 1 F. COOPER, supra note 4, at 109.
62. Id at 117.
63. See R. LORCH, supra note 6, at 102-05. Because of the potentially sweeping effect
of many of the excluded rules, Professor Lorch argues that it is unreasonable to exclude
such rules from the rulemaking requirements. Professor Lorch further argues that "[t]he
cause of democracy in rule-making is served by opening the doors of public participation
as widely as possible. Where law allows an agency to omit notice of proposed rule-making,
it makes more difficult the democratic process in administration." Id at 103. Segenera/l
Auerbach, supra note 40, at 163 (suggesting that "there is greater reason to require Attor-
ney General approval of rules that may be adopted without satisfying the rulemaking
procedures prescribed by MAPA than of rules that must satisfy these procedures").
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court decisions have interpreted the statutory definitions. 64 Administra-
tive law is still a relatively new field that has not yet developed an exten-
sive body of judicial law. In addition, because many states allow
petitioners the opportunity to present their grievances to hearing exam-
iners and state district courts, many cases raising significant administra-
tive law issues are never heard by the state's appellate courts.
In the few cases that have interpreted the statutory definition, one au-
thor has noted "a pervasive tendency on the part of the agencies to seek
to construe the statutory definition in a way which will exempt some
agency statements from the application of the definition." 65 Many agen-
cies apparently have attempted to skirt the statutory rulemaking proce-
dures66 by issuing rules under the guise of "bulletins," "guides," "policy
statements," or "announcements."6
7
Consistent with the trend in other states,68 the Minnesota Supreme
Court has not been confronted with many cases requiring a determina-
tion of what agency statements or conduct constitute rulemaking. In
Wacha v. Kandyohi County Welfare Board,69 the Minnesota court considered
whether a public welfare bulletin, reminding county welfare agents to
notify recipients that they should use their tax refunds to meet current
needs, was a rule that the Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of
Welfare had issued without complying with statutory rulemaking proce-
dures. 70 The Wacha court determined that the welfare bulletin consti-
tuted "merely a restatement of existing welfare policy and a directive
concerning internal management." 7I The court further held that the
welfare bulletin was not intended to have the force and effect of law but
rather was intended to implement the existing law.72 The Wacha court
concluded that because MAPA only required compliance with the for-
mal rulemaking procedure if the rule was intended to have the force and
effect of law, the welfare bulletin was not invalid.
73
The same issue arose in McKee v. LikUns, 74 in which a county resident
challenged the authority of state and county welfare officials to provide
medical assistance to welfare recipients for abortions.75 The medical
64. See 1 F. COOPER, supra note 4, at 118.
65. Id
66. See Allied Theatres v. Commissioner, 338 Mass. 609, 611, 156 N.E.2d 424, 426
(1959) (minimum wage order of somewhat limited application deemed rulemaking); Peo-
ple v. Cull, 10 N.Y.2d 123, 126, 176 N.E.2d 495, 497, 218 N.Y.S.2d 38, 40 (1961) (setting
speed limit deemed rulemaking).
67. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
68. See note 64 supra and accompanying text.
69. 308 Minn. 418, 242 N.W.2d 837 (1976) (per curiam).
70. See id at 419, 242 N.W.2d at 838.
71. Id at 421, 242 N.W.2d at 839.
72. See id
73. See id
74. 261 N.W.2d 566 (Minn. 1977) (per curiam).
75. See id at 568.
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assistance was provided pursuant to a policy bulletin that the Commis-
sioner of Welfare had issued,76 according to which medical coverage was
allowed for elective, nontherapeutic abortions. 77 The McKee court held
that the policy bulletin constituted a rule 78 by construing the statutory
definition to include agency activities and to exclude "specific activity as
it deemed beneficial to the concerns of efficient government and public
participation." 79 The McKee court then considered whether the policy
bulletin fit within any of the exceptions to the definition of "rule." Find-
ing that the statutory language in MAPA did not exclude statements of
general applicability such as the policy bulletin, the Minnesota court
concluded that the policy bulletin was invalid because it had not been
issued in compliance with the statutory rulemaking process.80
These Minnesota cases illustrate the types of agency conduct that have
been challenged as rulemaking and the analysis that the Minnesota court
may apply. While both the Wacha and McKee cases involved welfare
policy bulletins, the approach that the Minnesota court took was not the
same in both cases. In Wacha, the court focused on the legal effect of the
bulletin, while in McKee, the emphasis was on the statutory definition of
"rule."
III. FUNCTIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE RULES
A. Types of Rules
In attempting to achieve a workable definition of "rule," commenta-
tors have categorized rules into three basic types. These categories are
procedural rules,8 1 legislative rules,8 2 and interpretative rules.83 The dis-
tinctions among these categories is not always precise.84 In some cases, a
rule may be described by two or more of the basic types. 85 Despite the
occasional difficulty in categorizing rules, the distinction among the
three types becomes important in judicial decisions regarding the proce-
dural requirements followed in promulgating the rules8 6 and in deter-
76. See id
77. See id at 576.
78. See id at 577.
79. Id
80. See id at 578.
81. See notes 88-91 infra and accompanying text.
82. See notes 92-94 infra and accompanying text.
83. See notes 95-105 infta and accompanying text.
84. See 1 F. COOPER, supra note 4, at 173 ("While the categories are neither precise
nor clearcut, and while some rules serve two or more of these three purposes simultane-
ously, nevertheless the distinction is important.").
85. Id at 173 n. I.
86. For example, FAPA excludes interpretative rules from its procedural require-




William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 3 [1981], Art. 3
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol7/iss3/3
DEFINITION OF "RULE"
mining the validity and legal effect to be given a rule.87
l. Procedural Rules
Examples of rules falling within this category are guidelines for the
filing of applications, the institution of complaints, the serving of papers,
and the conduct of hearings. 88 Such rules force agencies to describe their
procedural practices and are considered particularly helpful to persons
unfamiliar with the practices of an agency.89 Procedural rules are recog-
nized as having the force and effect of law unless they are found to con-
flict with the statutory requirements.90 One author states that "the
adoption of procedural rules involves principally the development of a
working compromise between the agency's interest in unregulated fluid-
ity of procedure, and the public's interest in being able to ascertain in
advance the mechanics which will govern the disposition of cases."' 9 Be-
cause procedural rules are readily identifiable as such, their adoption is
not controversial.
2. Legislative Rules
Professor Davis defines legislative rules as "the product of an exercise
of delegated legislative power to make law through rules."92 The term
"legislative rule" is not defined in FAPA, MAPA, or the Revised Model
Act and, as Professor Davis has noted, "the term 'legislative rule' or 'leg-
islative regulation' apparently does not appear in any Supreme Court
opinion." 9 3 Legislative rules are important because of the authoritative
weight of the policy they announce. Legislative rules typically have the
following characteristics: (1) the rule provides sanctions for its violation;
(2) the rule carries the force and effect of law; (3) the rule creates a new
area of law; and (4) the rule is issued pursuant to a valid delegation of
rulemaking power.94
87. See notes 99-100 infra and accompanying text.
88. See 1 F. COOPER, supra note 4, at 266-67.
89, See id at 173. According to Professor Cooper, "the term procedural rules refers to
those describing the methods by which the agency will carry out its appointed functions-
rules which make provisions for the filing of applications, the institution of complaints, the
serving of papers, the conduct of hearings, and the like." Id (emphasis in original).
90. See id at 266-67.
91. Id at 174.
92. 2 K. DAVIS, szra note 2, § 7:8, at 36 (2d ed. 1979).
93. 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 5.03, at 298 (1958).
94. One author lists the following as characteristic of a legislative rule:
(1) it is issued by an agency pursuant to a valid delegation of rulemaking au-
thority from Congress; (2) the delegating legislation contains sanctions either in
the form of imposition of penalties or withholding benefits that are applied when
there is nonconformance to the regulation; (3) the delegating statute usually
contains provisions which become fully operative only after an exercise of the
agency's delegated authority to issue legislative rules; (4) it receives statutory
force upon going into effect; (5) often the delegation is phrased in terms like,
"the agency may make such rules and regulations as are necessary to effectuate
1981]
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3. Interpretative Rules
An interpretative rule has been defined as "any rule an agency issues
without exercising delegated legislative power to make law through
rules" 9 5 and as any rule that clarifies "the meaning of language in stat-
utes or other rules without creating legally binding rights or obliga-
tions."9 6  According to Professor Davis, the meaning of the term
"interpretative rules" is not made clear by either FAPA or the immediate
legislative history of the act.9 7 Interpretative rules have a number of
characteristics. 98 While valid legislative rules clearly have the effect of
law,99 interpretative rules only sometimes have the force of law.OO Pro-
fessor Davis notes, however, that while courts are free to deny recognition
to interpretative rules, they often defer to them.O1 Another author has
the provisions of this section"; (6) it is, in effect, an administrative statute and
actually creates law where none theretofore existed; and (7) it is limited only by
the doctrine of ultra vires-it must fall within the bounds of the delegated author-
ity, must be issued in accord with procedural due process, and must not be un-
reasonable, arbitrary or capricious.
Warren, The Notice Requirement in Admin'strative Rultmaking: An Analysis of Legislative and
Interpretive Rules, 29 AD. L. REv. 367, 372-73 (1977).
95. 2 K. DAvIs, supra note 2, § 7:8, at 36 (2d ed. 1979).
96. Asimow, supra note 25, at 523.
97. K. DAvis, supra note 26, § 5.03, at 126.
98. The characteristics of an interpretative rule are described as follows:
(1) it is a rule issued by an agency not pursuant to a valid delegation of law-
making power; (2) there is generally an implied power to issue such rules since it
is logically impossible for an agency to effectuate the policies and purposes of the
statute without limiting or expanding the coverage of the statute by interpreta-
tion of the statutory terms; (3) it is ordinarily of an advisory nature merely indi-
cating the agency's present belief concerning the meaning of applicable statutory
language; (4) it merely construes the terms of the statute and does not add any-
thing to the statute by making new law; (5) it merely guides subordinate admin-
istrative officers in the administration of the statute and informs the public of the
way the agency intends to administer the statute; (6) it does not have the force
and effect of law; and (7) if there is disagreement with it, it is subject to full
plenary review by a court and theoretically may be refused judicial recognition.
Warren, supra note 94, at 373.
99. For a general discussion of the legal effect of legislative rules, see 1 F. COOPER,
supra note 4, at 264-65.
100. In the case of Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), the Court determined
whether an interpretation was made in the course of an administrator's official duties. In
discussing the effect of interpretative rules, the Skidmore Court stated:
We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Adminis-
trator under this Act, while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their
authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which
courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a
judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking
power to control.
Id at 140. For a general discussion of the legal effect of interpretative rules, see 1 F.
COOPER, supra note 4, at 265-66.
101. See 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 2, § 7:8, at 36-37 (2d ed. 1979).
Courts always have power to substitute their judgment for administrative judg-
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observed that "[n]o sanction attaches to the violation of an interpretative
rule as such; the sanction attaches to the violation of the statute, which
the rule merely interprets."102
Interpretative rules are important in several respects. First, interpreta-
tive rules give the public an indication of the agency's position on various
policy matters.10 3 In addition to giving notice to the public, interpreta-
tive rules provide guidance to agency staff when attempting to adminis-
ter the duties delegated to the agency by law. 104 Without the framework
of administrative policy provided by interpretative rules, persons dealing
both with and within agencies would be forced to act without clear gui-
dance, thus creating the problem of different agency personnel interpret-
ing the enabling legislation in different ways.105
B. Distinctions Between Legislative and Interpretative Rules
It has been suggested that while the theoretical differences between
legislative and interpretative rules are rather clear, in practice the two
types of rules do not differ significantly. 106 Under FAPA, however, the
distinction becomes important in terms of the procedure followed in
promulgating the rules: FAPA specifically excludes interpretative rules
from its rulemaking procedural requirements.107 The exclusion of inter-
pretative rules from the FAPA rulemaking requirements apparently is
based on the desirability of encouraging agencies to make rules that are
readily subject to review.108 Despite the procedural difference in
ment as to the content of interpretative rules, but they refrain in varying degrees
from substituting judgment in various circumstances; they give special weight to
interpretative rules, often equaling or approximating force of law, when rules are
within an agency's specialization or outside judicial competence, when rules are
issued contemporaneously with the statutory enactment, when rules are long-
standing, and when rules are unchanged in statutory reenactment.
Id
102. 1 F. COOPER, supra note 4, at 175.
103. See Asimow, supra note 25, at 529 ("interpretive rules and policy statements are of
great importance to the public in alerting them to the agency's position on substantive
matters").
104. See id
105. See id (interpretive rules and policy statements "are needed to guide the staff in
administering the statute and in assisting regulated persons to comply with the law").
106. See Davis, supra note 16, at 932.
107. See 5 U.S.C. § 533(b)(A) (1976).
108. As to the exclusion of interpretative rules from formal rulemaking procedures:
First, it is desired to encourage the making of such rules. Secondly, [these] types
of rules vary so greatly in their contents and the occasion for their issuance that it
seems wise to leave the matter of notice and public procedures to the discretion
of the agencies concerned. Thirdly, the provision for petitions contained in sub-
section (c) affords an opportunity for private parties to secure a reconsideration
of such rules when issued. Another reason, which might be added, is that "inter-
pretative" rules--as merely interpretations of statutory provisions--are subject
to plenary judicial review, whereas "substantive" rules involve a maximum of
administrative discretion.
Auerbach, supra note 40, at 158 (quoting SENATE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, ADMINIS-
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promulgating interpretative and legislative rules under FAPA, the argu-
ment has been made that the distinction between legislative and inter-
pretative rules is becoming increasingly irrelevant. 109 Such an argument
is consistent with cases requiring agencies to provide notice and comment
procedures before adopting interpretative rules having a substantial im-
pact. Indeed, from the public viewpoint, the disadvantage of an inter-
pretative rule is that it has, in effect, the force of law, without the
requirement of public notice and an opportunity to be heard. 110 Unlike
FAPA, however, MAPA requires compliance with the statutory rulemak-
ing procedures for all types of rules.III
To illustrate the merging of legislative and interpretive rules the sec-
tions that follow will identify four basic areas in.which these rules tradi-
tionally have differed and contrast that with the current approach.
Z Authority to Make Rules
In contrast to the traditional view that legislative rules must be
adopted pursuant to a specific statutory delegation and that interpreta-
tive rules must be adopted pursuant to a general statutory grant of au-
thority, 12 the present view is that both legislative and interpretative
rules can be adopted pursuant to either a specific or general statutory
delegation of authority. 113 The rationale for allowing rules to be
adopted pursuant to a general delegation of power is based on judicial
recognition that an agency's expertise must be given great deference. 14
TRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.
18 (1946)).
109. See Asimow, supra note 25, at 560-61 ("[R]ecent developments of fundamental
significance in administrative law have begun to make the distinction more difficult to
draw and increasingly irrelevant.").
110. At least one author, Professor Lorch, has criticized the exclusion of interpretative
rules from FAPA as being unreasonable. See R. LORCH, supra note 63, at 103. Professor
Lorch states that interpretative rules
can have sweeping effect, as, for example, when an agency interprets a rule that
prohibits bars within one block of a school to mean one block as the crow flies.
The interpretation could very well put some people out of business. They have a
right to know what interpretation the agency is contemplating. They who are
about to be injured might want to present their views on the subject.
Id
111. See Auerbach, supra note 40, at 158.
112. See Asimow, supra note 25, at 561.
113. See id. ("[I]t is universally accepted that agencies can adopt legislative rules pursu-
ant to general rule-making powers.'); Davis, supra note 16, at 929 ("Although assertions
have been made that authority to make legislative rules must be specifically delegated,
and although such authority usually is not inherent in other administrative tasks, yet both
legislative and interpretative rules may clearly rest upon statutory authority which is ei-
ther express or implied.').
114. See Asimow, supra note 25, at 562-63. Professor Asimow states that
if the administrative process is to be effective, specific regulations under general
statutory delegations of power have to be treated as authoritative, regardless of
whether they are labelled legislative or interpretive, especially in areas where the
[Vol. 7
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Consequently, agencies acting pursuant to a general delegation of
rulemaking authority probably can adopt legislative rules after comply-
ing with the procedural requirements.'15
2. Authoritative Weight of Rules
The traditional view of the authoritative weight of legislative rules and
interpretative rules is that legislative rules have the force of law upon
going into effect and that interpretative rules merely interpret existing
law and do not have the force and effect of law.116 Professor Davis re-
jects the view that interpretative rules merely interpret existing law.117
Because interpretative rules are based on agency experience, policy con-
siderations, and court decisions as well as conventional methods of inter-
pretation, Professor Davis states that such rules go far beyond mere
interpretations."i 8 Professor Asimow points out that as a matter of prac-
tice, courts defer to interpretative rules,' 1 9 thereby adding to their au-
thoritative weight.
Three situations have been identified in which the weight given to in-
terpretative rules is said to approximate the force of law.120 The first
situation arises when the interpretative rule is made, contemporaneous
with the enactment of the enabling statute, by agency personnel familiar
with the legislative intent.12 1 The second situation arises when the ad-
ministrative interpretation has been adhered to for a long time.122 Fi-
nally, interpretative rules are given the force of law when the underlying
agency possesses expertise not shared by the courts. Where once it might have
demanded proof of specific delegation of legislative rule-making authority, the
court stated that it had learned from experience to accept a general delegation of
power as sufficient in certain areas of expertise.
Id
115. Ste id. at 563.
116. See Comptroller of Treasury v. M.E. Rockhill, Inc., 205 Md. 226, 234, 107 A.2d
93, 98 (1954); Davis, supra note 16, at 928; notes 99-100 supra and accompanying text.
117. See Davis, supra note 16, at 933.
118. See id "So long as the rules represent an interpretation of the statute which is
acceptable to the court, they possess (in one sense) the force of law. But they lose all force
and effect if held to be an incorrect interpretation." I F. COOPER, supra note 4, at 265.
119. See Asimow, supra note 25, at 565.
120. See Davis, supra note 16, at 936.
121. See id. at 936-37.
122. See id at 938-39. In Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79 (1938), the Court stated:
"Treasury regulations and interpretations long continued without substantial change, ap-
plying to unamended or substantially reenacted statutes, are deemed to have received
congressional approval and have the effect of law." Id at 83 (footnote omitted).
The Minnesota court went further in Ingebritson v. Tjernlund Mfg. Co., 289 Minn.
232, 183 N.W.2d 552 (1971). The Ingebrn'son court stated: "A reasonable departmental
practice in the administration of the statute is normally accorded substantial considera-
tion,. . . but even a longstanding administrative practice is not binding if it is erroneous
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enabling statute has been reenacted by the legislature.123 Consideration
of this third situation has not been limited to interpretative rules but also
has been applied in determining the validity of a legislative rule.124
3. Judicial Review
A third area in which an obvious distinction traditionally existed be-
tween legislative and interpretative rules is the scope of review of such
rules. The traditional approach viewed interpretative rules merely as
agency opinion with the courts left free to substitute their own judg-
ment. 12 5 Legislative rules, however, were overruled only when they were
arbitrary or capricious or not rationally related to the underlying stat-
ute. 126 The current approach of the courts has been to scrutinize the
entire record supporting legislative rules more carefully, while requiring
a less intense examination of the record supporting interpretative
rules.12 7 Professor Asimow states that a distinction in the scope of review
for legislative and interpretative rules should be maintained. 128 Since
not all interpretative rules are thoughtfully drafted, Professor Asimow
would allow courts to "retain their power to substitute judgment on is-
sues of law, giving deference to the administrative interpretation when
appropriate, but substituting judgment when the court's superior ability




The actual distinction between legislative and interpretative rules is
greater in theory than in practice in the area of retroactivity. Tradition-
ally, legislative rules were applied prospectively and interpretative rules
were applied retroactively.130 Retroactive legislative rules, however,
should be valid only in the same exceptional situations in which statutes
are retroactive.131 In addition, another obstacle to applying a legislative
rule retroactively is that agencies have no power except those conferred
by the legislature, and the power to issue retroactive rules is not easily
implied. 13 2 On the other hand, the argument for making interpretative
rules prospective is based on the many definitions of "rule" that include
language requiring that "rules" be of "future effect" and on the fact that
123. See Davis, supra note 16, at 939-43.
124. See id at 943.
125. See Asimow, supra note 25, at 563.
126. See id
127. See id at 564-65.
128. See id at 567 ("[Ilt would be undesirable if the differences [between the scope of
review for legislative and interpretive rules] were wholly to disappear.").
129. Id (footnote omitted).
130. See id at 569.
131. See id at 569-70; Davis, supra note 16, at 944-45.
132. See Davis, supra note 16, at 945.
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people rely on interpretative rules in determining what course of conduct
to follow. 133
C The Minnesota Approach
In McKee v. Likins,1 34 the Minnesota Supreme Court for the first time
expressly recognized three types of rules-procedural, legislative, and in-
terpretative.135 While avoiding the issue of whether the Minnesota De-
partment of Public Welfare had attempted to publish a procedural,
legislative, or interpretative rule in adopting the policy bulletin,13 6 the
McKee court found that the bulletin "involved a question of social and
political policy so important to the public as a whole as to require that
the rulemaking process of the Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act
be followed."1 37 In addition, the court interpreted MAPA as requiring
the notice and public hearing requirements to be followed when issuing
either legislative or interpretative rules.138
The McKee decision is important in Minnesota administrative law in
two respects. First, the Minnesota court attempted to clarify what kind
of agency activity will be considered rulemaking. In addition, the court
chose to go beyond MAPA and expressly recognized three types of rules:
procedural, legislative, and interpretative.139
After the McKee decision, the Minnesota Supreme Court, in a limited
discussion, attempted further to define the three types of rules. In Minne-
sota-Dakotas Retail Hardware Association v. State,140 the court examined
rules promulgated by the Consumer Services Section of the Minnesota
Department of Commerce. The rules at issue in Minnesota-Dakotas were
promulgated according to the notice and comment mandate of
MAPA. 14' The rules were challenged on the ground that the agency had
no statutory authority to make substantive rules.142 The court found
that the enabling legislation did not authorize the promulgation of legis-
lative regulations having the force of law, and refused to construe the
statute as conferring upon the agency the implicit authority to adopt
legislative rules."4 3 The court further held that "[w]hile it is true that
Consumer Services does not have legislative rule-making power, we con-
clude that these rules come within the statutory power conferred upon
Consumer Services to promulgate interpretative rules and are a valid ex-
133. See Asimow, supra note 25, at 570-71.
134. 261 N.W.2d 566 (Minn. 1977) (per curiam).
135. See id at 577.
136. See id at 577-78.
137. Id
138. See id at 578.
139. See id at 577.
140. 279 N.W.2d 360 (Minn. 1979).
141. See id at 362.
142. See id
143. See id at 364.
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ercise of that power."' 144
In reaching its decision, the Minnesota-Dakotas court first examined the
enabling legislation of the Consumer Services Section.145 The legislation
authorized the Section to adopt rules to implement the statutory lan-
guage. 146 The court then acknowledged the existence of the three types
of administrative rules set forth in MKee. 14 7 The Minesota-Dakotas deci-
sion, however, went beyond the McKee decision in that the court at-
tempted to define interpretative and legislative rules.148 Interpretative
rules were defined by the court as "those rules coming within the defini-
tion of 'rule' . . . which are promulgated to make specific the law en-
forced or administered by the agency ' 149 and legislative rules were
defined as those rules "enacted pursuant to delegated powers to make
substantive law, and, in contrast to interpretative rules, have the force
and effect of law."150
in a footnote, the court attempted to distinguish between the procedu-
ral requirements of FAPA and MAPA:
Unlike the federal administrative procedures act, Minn. St. ch. 15
does not except interpretative rules from the procedural requirements
for adoption of regulations. Minn. St. 1974, § 15.0413, subd. 1, which
provided that agency standards, statements of policy or interpretations
of general application and future effect did not have the effect of law
unless adopted as a rule in accordance with ch. 15, was repealed by
L. 1975, c. 380, § 3. Under the current statute, all "ru/es," as defined by
§ 15.0411, subd 3, whether or not they have the effect of law, are subject to the
statutog rule-makig procedure. . . . Only agency rules concerning inter-
nal management which do not directly affect the rights of or procedure
available to the public or certain rules of specified agencies are ex-
cluded from the procedures set forth in ch. 15.151
Although the court was correct in its statement that MAPA, unlike
FAPA, does not exclude interpretative rules from its procedural require-
ments, its statement that all rules are subject to the procedural require-
ments of MAPA, whether or not they have the force of law, indicates
that the court was not familiar with all of the provisions of MAPA. The
footnote language contradicts section 15.0413 of MAPA, which provided
in relevant part that "[e]very rule approved by the attorney general and
filed in the office of the secretary of state . . .shall have the force and
effect of law 20 days after its publication in the state register unless a
144. Id
145. See id.
146. See id The court found that section 45.16 of Minnesota Statutes authorized Con-
sumer Services to "[a]dopt, pursuant to the administrative procedures act, rules and regu-
lations to implement the provisions of this section." Id
147. See id.
148. See id at 364-65.
149. Id at 364 (footnote omitted).
150. Id at 365.
151. See id at 364 n.6 (emphasis added).
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later date is required by statute or specified in the rule."152 This lan-
guage clearly gives the force and effect of law to all rules adopted in
compliance with statutory rulemaking procedures.
In recognizing and defining legislative and interpretative rules, the
Minnesota-Dakotas court adhered to the traditional view of such rules
rather than to the more practical view which recognizes that the distinc-
tions between the two types of rules are often blurred.153 For example,
the court distinguished between the legal effect of the two types of rules,
and refused to imply a grant of statutory power to adopt legislative
rules. 154
The approach taken by both the Minnesota Legislature and the Min-
nesota Supreme Court in declining to exclude interpretative rules from
the rulemaking procedures of MAPA is consistent with the growing idea
that the public should be allowed to participate in the adoption of rules
that have a substantial impact on private rights and obligations, regard-
less of whether the statute requires participation.155 Some commentators
have suggested that perhaps interpretative rules should be expressly ex-
cluded from the procedural requirements of administrative procedure
acts because the procedural requirements may discourage agencies from
issuing claryifying statements. 56 On the other hand, because of the
practical difficulty in always distinguishing between legislative and inter-
pretative rules, the comment has been made that an exclusion for inter-
pretative rules makes it possible for agencies to circumvent rulemaking
152. Act of June 4, 1975, ch. 380, § 3, 1975 Minn. Laws 1285, 1288 (amended 1980,
1981) (current version at MINN. STAT. § 15.0413(1) (Supp. 1981) (current version states
that every rule, regardless of whether it may be substantive, procedural, or interpretive,
has force and effect of law)).
153. See notes 106-33 supra and accompanying text.
154. See 279 N.W.2d at 365. The Minnesota-Dakotas court stated:
In the instant case, however, authorization for the promulgation of legisla-
tive regulations with the force and effect of law ... is absent from the statute,
and, as we recently stated in State, by Spannanus v. Lloyd 4. Fq Roofing Co., 310
Minn. 528, 534, 246 N.W.2d 696, 700, n.6 (1976):
"... Courts cannot properly aid the agency by construing the stat-
ute to confer upon it implicit authority, when to do so would contra-
vene the legislature's apparently deliberate failure to explicitly grant it
such authority."
Id.
155. See Auerbach, supra note 40, at 159. The author states:
Professor Kenneth Culp Davis points out that, even on the federal level, the idea
is growing that fairness requires that the public be afforded the opportunity to
participate in the making of those rules that have substantial impact on private
rights and obligations whether or not FAPA mandates such an opportunity.
Id (footnote omitted).
156. See id at 158; accord, Asimow, supra note 25, at 575. Professor Asimow has ob-
served that "[t]he APA draftsmen wished to encourage the adoption of interpretive rules
and policy statements by not requiring burdensome procedures. They were also con-
cerned by the inappropriateness of mandating a single, rigid procedure for the many
forms that nonlegislative rulemaking may take." Id (footnote omitted).
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procedures.15 7 One author, who favors an exemption for interpretative
rules, suggests that agencies voluntarily subject themselves to rulemaking
procedures when it is feasible and useful.158 While there are no clear
answers as to which route would best encourage both public participa-
tion and clarifying statements from agencies, it does not appear to make
much difference what agencies call the rules they adopt since all rules
adopted in compliance with MAPA have the force and effect of law.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Minnesota Legislature is the proper source to look to for clarifica-
tion of the status of administrative rules in Minnesota. This Note has
identified several areas in need of change or clarification.
First, the legislature should define the three rule types-procedural,
legislative, and interpretative-identified by the Minnesota court. While
the Minnesota court has yet to undertake any more than an abbreviated
analysis of these rule types, the court has defined them according to
traditional distinctions. Although theoretically the distinctions are
sound under a FAPA-type statute, the practical reality of agency activity
under the various rule categories indicates that the distinctions are more
blurred than real if all rules must satisfy the formal rulemaking
requirements.
Because of this, the Minnesota Legislature should clarify the status of
interpretative rules by determining whether Minnesota, like the federal
government, also wishes to exempt interpretative rules from the procedu-
ral requirements of MAPA. Unless MAPA is amended to distinguish
between the legal effect of procedural, legislative, and interpretative
rules, or to exempt interpretative rules from its procedural requirements,
it is questionable whether the different categories of rules have any real
significance. Requiring compliance with notice and comment rulemak-
ing procedures is consistent with the trend of encouraging greater public
participation in the adoption of all types of rules.
Undoubtedly, it is questionable whether a definition of "rule" will ever
be precise enough to encompass all types of agency rulemaking activity.
As Professor Davis has stated:
If the legislators were omniscient and had at their disposal linguistic
precision tools, the interpreter's function would involve no more than
finding and applying the meaning of words. But since legislators can
neither anticipate all problems nor define terms with minute exactness,
judges must necessarily cooperate with legislators in trying to build a
sound and workable system. Judges who rest interpretations solely
157. See Auerbach, supra note 40, at 158.
158. Bonfield, Some Tentative Thoughts on Public Participation in the Making of Interpretative
Rules and General Statements of Policy Under theAPA., 23 AD. L. REv. 101, 127-28 (1971); see
Auerbach, supra note 40, at 160. See general4y Asimow, supra note 25, at 529 (discussion of
trend toward voluntary use of public participation by agencies).
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upon abstract meanings of words fail to do their part as working part-
ners with legislators. The meaning of such a term as "rule" must fre-
quently depend not only upon word contexts but also upon practical
contexts. 159
159. Davis, supra note 16, at 924.
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